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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John L. Flynn*
When Two Persons Have Equal Rights to
Premises, Consent of Either Legalizes Search-
Police officers arrested defendant pursuant to
his wife's complaint that he had threatened her
with a gun after a quarrel in their home. At her
invitation a search was instigated, and the gun
found in the family garage. At the trial de-
fendant made a timely motion to suppress the
gun as evidence, but the motion was overruled,
as was his objection when the gun was offered
and received in evidence. Defendant appealed
his conviction asserting a violation of his right
against unlawful searches as guaranteed by the
Illinois constitution. Held, affirmed. People v.
Shambley, 122 N.E.2d 172 (Ill. 1954). The
supreme court in holding that the wife's consent
waived defendant's constitutional immunity
noted that the house was in joint tenancy.
Thus, "it is clear that in giving her consent she
was not acting as agent for husband but was
acting in her own right as occupant of the
premises."
Law Enforcement Officers not Liable under
Federal Civil Rights Act-A prisoner in-
carcerated under the authority of the State of
Illinois was found to have been deprived of
constitutional rights and was granted a new
trial under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing
Act. The acts complained of were the unlawful
search of his person, the seizure of his personal
property, the introduction into evidence of the
unlawfully seized property, and the deliberate
use of perjured testimony at the trial. Although
he was found guilty at a second trial in which
his rights were fully respected, he brought an
action founded on the Federal Civil Rights Act
seeking damages from the police officers who
participated in the unlawful seizure and who
offered the perjured testimony at the first trial.
* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University
School of Law.
Section 1938 of the Act gives a cause of action
for deprivation of due process; however, for
the following reason, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that the complaint in
the instant case did not state a cause of action.
Jennings v. Nester, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2257
(Dec. 7, 1954):
"The Civil Rights Acts were enacted to pro-
tect the civil rights of individuals, and not to
discipline local law enforcement officers for acts
that are later corrected.... The common law
provides adequate actions for damages against
errant law enforcement officials.... In deter-
mining whether or not [prisoner's] constitu-
tional rights have been deprived, we must look
at everything that transpired. It is obvious
from the complaint that as he stands today, the
[prisoner] has been accorded due process as re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment.
"If we should allow this action for what, if
anything, was only a temporary denial, then
every new trial under the Illinois Post-Convic-
tion Hearing Act, or any like proceedings in
other states, would give rise to a course of
action for damages under [the Federal Civil
Rights Act]. We are sure that Congress did not
not intend such a result.
"The purpose of the Civil Rights Acts has
been achieved with regard to the [prisoner]. He
has been given a fair hearing in the state courts
with every procedural guarantee required by
the Fourteenth Amendment. The improperly
obtained evidence was not used against him in
the second trial, which is even more than due
process requires."
Presumption that Owner of Automobile Was
Operating It at Time of Offense-In People v.
Hildebrandt, 129 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1954), defendant
appealed from a conviction of speeding. Evi-
dence of the claimed speeding violation was
obtained by photographs of the defendant's
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automobile from which, by means of a mathe-
matical formula, the speed of the automobile
was calculated. The accuracy of the camera and
method of computation were not question on
the appeal, and apparently its reliability was
demonstrated by an expert witness during the
trial. Defendant's contention that the proceed-
ing was defective because he was not notified of
the alleged offense until about two weeks after
its occurrence was rejected on the ground that
by statute prosecution for traffic infractions
may be commenced any time within a period of
two years from the date of commission. The
court also held that proof of defendant's owner-
ship of the automobile raised a rebuttable pre-
sumption that he was the operator at the time
of the offense. A decision of the Court of Ap-
peals, People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E.2d
501 (1940), was cited which upheld the same
presumption with reference to a violation of
parking regulations. Still another presumption
confronted the defendant. The court declared
that he was the same person who registered as
the owner since "there is a presumption of the
identity of a person from the identity of his
name" even in criminal cases "if fortified by
circumstances."
Sleeping on Subway Not Disorderly Con-
duct-Defendants were charged with disorderly
conduct in that they went to sleep upon seats
of subway trains to the annoyance of pas-
sengers. A city magistrate court of New York
held that the involuntary act of sleeping did not
constitute disorderly conduct. People v. S?stek,
204 Misc. 514, 124 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1953).
"These defendants, by all appearances, are
derelicts, but they are human souls whose
rights may not be trampled on and against
whom a non-existing offense may not be used
merely because they present a practical prob-
lem to the authorities in charge of our transit
system.... It is common knowledge that many
persons fall asleep on trains. Would this mean
that they are ipso facto guilty of disorderly
conduct? If so, many of our citizens who use
the rapid transit facilities of our city must at
least once in their lives have been guilty of
disorderly conduct, and this court must confess
that if sleeping on a train be the test, he is a
confirmed violator of the statutes against dis-
orderly conduct.... If these defendants are
vagrants, they should be tried as such, but to
let them plead guilty to disorderly conduct...
would make a mockery of justice."
